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Recently, Antonioni and Cardillo proposed a coevolutionary model based on the intertwining of oscillator
synchronization and evolutionary game theory [Phys. Rev. Lett. 118, 238301 (2017)], in which each Kuramoto
oscillator can decide whether to interact-or not-with its neighbors, and all oscillators can receive some benefits
from the local synchronization but those who choose to interact must pay a cost. Oscillators are allowed to
update their strategies according to payoff difference, wherein the strategy of an oscillator who has obtained
higher payoff is more likely to be followed. Utilizing this coevolutionary model, we find that the global syn-
chronization level reaches the highest level when the average degree of the underlying interaction network is
moderate. We also study how synchronization is affected by the individual rationality in choosing strategy.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc, 05.45.Xt, 02.50.Le
I. INTRODUCTION
Synchronization is the coordination of events to operate a
system in unison, which is ubiquitous in natural world and
human society. For example, two pendulum clocks suspended
side by side swing with the same frequency, a school of fish
move in the same direction [1], opinions of different indi-
viduals reach a consensus [2], all generators in a power-grid
system rotate at the same frequency [3], and so on. Due to
the rapid development of network science [4–6], the study
of synchronization in complex networks has attracted increas-
ing attention [7, 8]. It has been found that both the network
structure [9–11] and the coupling scheme [12–14] play crucial
roles in the synchronization processes.
Among many models for synchronization phenomena, the
Kuramoto model is the most popular nowadays [15–17],
where many oscillators with heterogeneous natural frequen-
cies couple through the sine of their phase differences. When
this coupling is strong enough, all oscillators eventually rotate
at the same frequency. In its original model, all agents interact
with their neighbors all the time. However, the interaction is
usually costly in reality. Due to the existence of costly interac-
tions, some agents may choose not to interact with neighbors
at some time, which impedes synchronization of the whole
system.
How to understand the emergence of synchronization with
costly interactions is a challenging issue. Recently, Antonioni
and Cardillo incorporated the evolutionary game in the Ku-
ramoto model [18]. They assumed that agents can decide
whether to interact-or not-with their neighbors. All agents re-
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ceive the benefit from the local synchronization but those who
choose to interact with their neighbors must pay some cost.
Each agent’s payoff is thus given by the net gain of benefit
and cost. After each time step, agents are allowed to update
their strategies by comparing payoffs with their neighbors.
The strategies of agents with higher payoffs are more likely
to be imitated. In this sense, this toy model can be named as
the evolutionary Kuramoto game (EKG).
The EKG sheds some light on the study of self-organized
interactions. Agents in EKG face a dilemma, that is, the in-
teraction with neighbors helps to enhance synchronization of
the whole system but the interaction cost weakens the will-
ingness of agents’ participation. So far, how to alleviate this
dilemma and enhance the global level of synchronization in
EKG are still unclear. In this paper, we find that both too few
and too many neighbors would suppress synchronization in
EKG. Besides, we have shown that the rationality of agents
plays a non-trivial role in EKG.
II. MODEL
Let us consider a network of N nodes and average de-
gree 〈k〉. Each node i represents a Kuramoto oscillator and it
can decide whether to interact-or not-with its neighbors. We
call an agent as a cooperator if it interacts with its neighbors.
Those who do not participate in such interaction are called as
defectors.
Following the work of Antonioni and Cardillo [18], agent l
changes its phase θl according to the following equation:
θ˙l = ωl + slλ
N∑
m=1
alm sin(θm − θl), (1)
where ωl is the natural frequency of l, sl is the strategy of l
(sl = 1 if l is a cooperator and sl = 0 if it is a defector), λ is
2the coupling strength, and alm is the element of the adjacency
matrix (alm = 1 if l and m is connected, and alm = 0 other-
wise). In this paper, both the initial phases θ and the natural
frequencies ω of all agents are uniformly distributed over the
interval [-pi,pi].
The local order parameter for a pair of nodes l andm, rlm,
is calculated by
rlme
i(θl+θm)/2 =
eiθl + eiθm
2
. (2)
The benefit of agent l is defined as its local order parameter,
which is determined by
rl =
∑N
m=1 almrlm∑N
m=1 alm
. (3)
The cost of an agent l is defined as the absolute value of the
angular acceleration, i.e.,
cl = |θ˙l(t)− θ˙l(t− ε)|, (4)
where ε is the step length used to compute Eq. (1) with the
fourth-order Runge-Kutta method. Note that the cost for a
defector is zero since its frequency is fixed at the natural fre-
quency. Finally, the payoff of an agent is defined as
Pl = rl − α cl
2pi
, (5)
where the cost is divided by 2pi to make it commensurable
with the benefit and a scalar α is named as the relative cost.
Initially, cooperators and defectors are randomly distributed
in a network with equal probability. All agents synchronously
update their strategies at discrete time steps tk (tk+1 − tk =
ε) according to the famous Fermi rule [19]. Specifically, an
agent l randomly selects one of its neighbors, m, and adopts
its strategy with a probability given by
W (sl ← sm) = 1
1 + exp[−β(Pm − Pl)] , (6)
where the parameter β (> 0) characterizes noise to permit ir-
rational choices (henceforthwe call β as the rationality param-
eter). Agents become more rational, i.e., have greater proba-
bility to follow the strategies of neighbors who have obtained
higher payoffs, as the rationality parameter β increases.
After a sufficiently long transient time, one can calculate
the average level of cooperation 〈C〉 and the global synchro-
nization 〈rG〉. Here 〈C〉 is defined as the fraction of coop-
erators in the steady state. The global order parameter rG is
calculated by
rGe
iΨ =
1
N
N∑
m=1
eiθm , (7)
where i is the imaginary unit and Ψ is the average phase of
the system.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) The average level of cooperation (synchro-
nization) 〈C〉 (〈rG〉) as a function of (a) the relative cost α and (b)
the coupling strength λ, respectively. The average degree of the net-
work 〈k〉 = 8 and the rationality parameter β = 1. For (a), the
coupling strength λ = 1. For (b), the relative cost α = 0.1.
III. ANALYSES
Without loss of generality, we carry out our study of the
model in Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) random graphs [20] with size
N = 2000. We set the step length ε = 0.01 in this paper
(we have checked that qualitative results keep unchanged for
a wide range of ε). In all simulations, we first wait 90000
Monte Carlo time steps to let the system attain steady state,
and then run another 10000 Monte Carlo time steps to cal-
culate the average level of cooperation (synchronization) 〈C〉
(〈rG〉). Finally, each data presented below results from an av-
erage over 200 independent realizations.
A. Effects of the relative cost α and the coupling strength λ
We first briefly review the effects of the relative cost α
and the coupling strength λ on the emergence of synchro-
nization and cooperation, which reproduce the findings re-
ported in [18]. Figure 1 shows the average level of cooper-
ation (synchronization) 〈C〉 (〈rG〉) as a function of the rela-
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The average level of cooperation 〈C〉 as a function of the average degree 〈k〉 for different values of (a) the relative cost
α, (b) the coupling strength λ and (c) the rationality parameter β, respectively. The average level of synchronization 〈rG〉 as a function of the
average degree 〈k〉 for different values of (d) the relative cost α, (e) the coupling strength λ and (f) the rationality parameter β, respectively.
For (a) and (d), the coupling strength λ = 1 and the rationality parameter β = 1. For (b) and (e), the relative cost α = 0.1 and the rationality
parameter β = 1. For (c) and (f), the relative cost α = 0.2 and the coupling strength λ = 1.
tive cost α and the coupling strength λ. One can find that 〈C〉
is positively correlated with 〈rG〉, that is, the more fraction
of cooperators, the higher level of the synchronization. From
Fig. 1(a), one can observe that both 〈C〉 and 〈rG〉 decrease
as the relative cost α increases. Obviously, the increase of
α leads to more expensive interaction, which decreases the
payoffs of cooperators. As a result, cooperators are more
likely to be replaced by defectors. The dependence of 〈C〉
(〈rG〉) on the coupling strength λ exhibits a non-monotonic
phenomenon, i.e., 〈C〉 (〈rG〉) reaches the maximum when the
value of λ is moderate (see Fig. 1 (b)). There exists two crit-
ical values of λ: λc1 and λc2. For λ < λc1 or λ > λc2,
〈rG〉 ≃ 0.
The lower limit λc1 is determined by the network structure
as
λc1 = λMF
〈k〉
〈k2〉 , (8)
where λMF (λMF=4 in this paper) is the critical value of the
coupling strength in the mean field case [21]. Below λc1,
oscillators rotate incoherently even they are all cooperators.
From Eqs. (1) and (4), one can note that the interaction cost is
positively related to the coupling strength λ. Too large value
of λ tremendously reduces the ratio of benefit to cost, leading
to the extinction of cooperators and an incoherent state of the
system. According to [18], cooperators can survive when
√
2 + 2sin(ελ)−√2
ελ〈k〉 pi > α. (9)
To satisfy the above equation, the coupling strength must be
below a certain value λc2.
We want to emphasize that the critical values of phase tran-
sitions are accurate for large system size. But in this paper,
we do not focus on the phase transitions and hence use a small
system.
B. Effects of the average degree 〈k〉
Figure 2 shows the average level of cooperation 〈C〉 (syn-
chronization 〈rG〉) as a function of the average degree 〈k〉 for
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FIG. 3: (Color online) (a) The average level of cooperation 〈C〉 and
(b) the average level of synchronization 〈rG〉 as a function of the
average degree 〈k〉 for WS and BA networks. The coupling strength
λ = 1, the relative cost α = 0.07 and the rationality parameter
β = 1. In WS networks, the rewiring probability is set to be 0.2.
different values of the relative cost α, the coupling strength λ
and the rationality parameter β. From Fig. 2 (a)-2(c), we ob-
serve that the cooperation level 〈C〉 keep almost unchanged
for small values of 〈k〉 and then decreases to zero as 〈k〉 con-
tinually increases.
In the original Kuramoto model, the increase of the aver-
age degree facilitates the attainment of synchronization [22].
However, the dependence of 〈rG〉 on 〈k〉 in the EKG displays
a nonmonotonic behavior. As shown in Fig. 2 (d)-2(f), there
exists an optimal value of 〈k〉, at which 〈rG〉 is maximized.
From Fig. 2(d) and 2(e), we observe that the optimal value
of 〈k〉 tends to decrease as the relative cost α or the coupling
strength λ increases. For α = 0.07, 0.1 and 0.2, the optimal
value of 〈k〉 is 18, 12 and 7 respectively (see Fig. 2(d)). For λ
= 0.7, 1 and 1.5, the optimal value of 〈k〉 is 20, 12 and 8 re-
spectively (see Fig. 2(e)). However, the optimal value of 〈k〉
appears to be a non-monotonic function of the rationality pa-
rameter β. For β = 0.2, 1 and 10, the optimal value of 〈k〉 is
9, 8 and 9 respectively, as shown in Fig. 2(f).
In the case of very small 〈k〉, the influence of neighbors is
so weak that oscillators are inclined to rotate at their own fre-
quencies. According to Eq. (8), we easily obtain 〈k〉/〈k2〉 =
1/(〈k〉 + 1) for ER random graphs. Thus the critical cou-
pling strength arousing the onset of a coherent state increases
as the average degree 〈k〉 decreases, indicating that one must
strengthen the coupling in order to reach the global synchro-
nization for small 〈k〉. In fact, small 〈k〉 not only hinders
synchronization in Kuramoto model but also impedes consen-
sus in opinion dynamics [2]. On the other hand, in the case
of very large 〈k〉, the system becomes close to the well-mixed
scenario. Due to the costly interaction, the payoffs of cooper-
ators are lower than those of defectors when 〈k〉 is very large.
In this case, the extinction of cooperators is inevitable. The
The full defection will lead to an incoherent state of the sys-
tem since all agents do not interact with neighbors and rotate
with their natural frequencies. The extinction of cooperators
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FIG. 4: (Color online) The average level of synchronization 〈rG〉 as
a function of the rationality parameter β for different values of (a)
the relative cost α and (b) the coupling strength λ, respectively. The
average degree of the network is 〈k〉 = 8. For (a), the coupling
strength λ = 1. For (b), the relative cost α = 0.2.
for the case of large 〈k〉 has also been found in the prisoner’s
dilemma game [23]. Combining the discussion of the two lim-
its of 〈k〉, highest synchronization level should be realized for
some intermediate values of 〈k〉.
In the above studies, we use ER random graphs. In
fact, qualitative results remain unchanged for other kinds
of networks including Watts-Strogatz (WS) small-world
networks [24] and Baraba´si-Albert (BA) scale-free net-
works [25]. From Fig. 3, one can see that for WS or BA
networks, the cooperation level 〈C〉 decreases as the average
degree 〈k〉 increases while the synchronization level 〈rG〉 is
maximized at a moderate value of 〈k〉.
C. Effects of the rationality parameter β
In the previous work [18], the rationality parameter β is
set to be 1. However, studies on other evolutionary games
have shown that, the cooperation level is largely affected by
the rationality parameter [26–29]. Figure 4 shows the average
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Color coded map of the average level of syn-
chronization 〈rG〉 in the parameter plane (β, α). The average degree
of the network 〈k〉 = 8 and the coupling strength λ = 1.
level of synchronization 〈rG〉 as a function of the rationality
parameter β for different values of the relative cost α and the
coupling strength λ. One can see that for small values of α
or λ (e.g., α = 0.1 or λ = 0.7), 〈rG〉 increases with β. On
the other hand, for large values of α or λ (e.g., α = 1.5 or
λ = 10), 〈rG〉 decreases as β increases. For moderate values
of α and λ, we notice that 〈rG〉 is minimized at the middle
values of β. The dependence of the average cooperation level
〈C〉 on β also obeys the above rule (results are not shown
here).
In Fig. 5, we plot a color coded map of 〈rG〉 in the param-
eter plane (β, α) by setting 〈k〉 = 8 and λ = 1. We find that,
for α < 0.25, 〈rG〉 increases with β. For 0.25 < α < 1.4,
〈rG〉 is minimized at the middle values of β. For α > 1.4,
〈rG〉 decreases as β increases.
It has been known that the formation of clusters plays an
important role in the evolutionary games [30, 31]. A coop-
erator (defector) cluster is a connected component fully com-
posed of cooperators (defectors). For small values of α or
λ, the interaction cost is much smaller than the benefits due
to mutual synchronization, leading to high payoffs of agents
inside cooperator clusters. The payoffs of agents inside defec-
tor clusters are usually low since they change phases indepen-
dently (no local synchronization is expected). Thus for small
values ofα or λ, the expansion of cooperator clusters becomes
easier as agents are more rational (i.e., the increase of β). On
the other hand, for very large values of α or λ, the interaction
cost is so large that cooperators cannot form stable clusters to
resist the invasion of defectors. In this case, the decrease of
β can reduce the probability that a cooperator is replaced by
a defector. Note that β = 0 corresponds to a random strategy
update, which is conceptually similar to a neutral drift of the
voter model [32]. For β = 0, the system has the equal proba-
bility to terminate in the full cooperation or the full defection,
leading to the average cooperation level 〈C〉 = 0.5.
To understand the nonmonotonic behavior appearing in the
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FIG. 6: (Color online) Time series of the cooperation (synchroniza-
tion) level 〈C(t)〉 (〈rG(t)〉) for (a) β = 4 and (b) β = 20 respec-
tively. The average degree of the network 〈k〉 = 8, the relative cost
α = 0.4 and the coupling strength λ = 1.
moderate region of α and λ, we study the time evolution of the
cooperation level 〈C(t)〉 (synchronization level 〈rG(t)〉) for
different values of the rationality parameter β. From Fig. 6(a),
we see that, for β = 4, 〈C(t)〉 decreases to 0 as time evolves,
meanwhile, 〈rG(t)〉 keeps close to 0 but slightly peaks at
about t = 100. For β = 20, 〈C(t)〉 initially decreases and
then increases to 1, meanwhile, 〈rG(t)〉 gradually increases
to about 0.9 (see Fig. 6(b)). From Fig. 6, one can find that
cooperator clusters continuously shrink and finally disappear
in the case of β = 4. However, for a large value of β (e.g.,
β = 20), cooperator clusters can survive after the initial inva-
sion of defectors. Note that the change of strategies happens
on the border that separates clusters of cooperators and defec-
tors. For a smaller value of β, cooperators along the border are
more likely to be replaced by neighboring defectors, leading
to the instability of cooperator clusters. However, for a very
large value of β, cooperators along the border cannot be in-
vaded once their payoffs are higher than those of neighboring
defectors. Cooperators inside a stable cluster can gain more
and more benefit from the mutual synchronization and the in-
teraction cost continually decreases as time evolves. From
Fig. 6(b), we observe that 〈rG(t)〉 rapidly increases from 0.05
to 0.6 while 〈C(t)〉 keeps around 0.6 during 200 < t < 500.
In this period, cooperators get more and more synchronized,
leading to the latter growth of cooperator clusters. Summa-
rizing, for moderate interaction cost, sufficient high extent of
rationality helps cooperators to survive and form tiny clus-
ters to compete with defectors in the initial stage, and then
enables them to strike back, leading to the high level of coop-
eration and synchronization in the later stage. Moderate ratio-
nality is, however, lack of the ability to stabilize the cluster of
cooperators, resulting in the lowest level of cooperation and
synchronization. It was worth noting that such nonmonotonic
phenomenon, i.e., the cooperation level reaches the minimum
at a moderate value of the rationality parameter, has also been
observed in the spatial public goods game [33] and snowdrift
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FIG. 7: (Color online) Time series of the average payoff of cooper-
ators 〈PC(t)〉 and defectors 〈PD(t)〉. The inset shows the average
cost of cooperators as time evolves. The average degree of the net-
work 〈k〉 = 8, the relative cost α = 0.4, the coupling strength λ = 1
and the rationality parameter β = 20.
game [34].
Figure 7 shows time series of the average payoff of cooper-
ators 〈PC(t)〉 and defectors 〈PD(t)〉 for the case of β = 20.
One can see that initially 〈PC(t)〉 is lower that 〈PD(t)〉. When
t > 10, 〈PC(t)〉 gradually exceeds 〈PD(t)〉. From the inset of
Fig. 6, we observe that the average cost of cooperators 〈cC(t)〉
decreases as time evolves. In the late stage of evolution, the
system is almost occupied by cooperators and only a few de-
fectors survive. The phases of these cooperators are almost the
same while defectors change their phases independently. Thus
the payoff of a defector fluctuates greatly in the late stage of
evolution. A defector gain a high (low) payoff when its phase
is the same (different) with those of cooperators.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, we have studied how the average interac-
tion degree and the extent of rationality affect the coevolution
of cooperation and synchronization. Our main findings can
be summarized as follows. (i) The cooperation level is posi-
tively correlated with the synchronization level, that is, more
cooperators will promote synchronization. (ii) Both of the co-
operation and synchronization levels decrease as the relative
cost increases. (iii) Both of the cooperation and synchroniza-
tion levels are maximized in the middle range of the coupling
strength. (iv) The cooperation level decreases as the average
degree of the network increases. But the synchronization level
is maximized at a moderate value of the average degree. (v)
The extent of rationality plays a nontrivial role in the cou-
pling dynamics. For small (large) values of the relative cost
or the coupling strength, both the cooperation and synchro-
nization levels increase (decrease) as the rationality param-
eter increases. For moderate values of the relative cost and
the coupling strength, however, both the cooperation and syn-
chronization levels are minimized at a middle value of the ra-
tionality parameter.
Our results offer a deeper understanding of the interplay of
synchronization dynamics and game theory. There remains a
number of open questions in EKG. For example, how the clus-
tering coefficient and degree correlations of the underlying
interaction network affect the synchronization? What would
happen if we use other rules of strategy updating in EKG? We
hope our work can stimulate more researchers into the study
of coevolution of synchronization and cooperation.
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